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CASE COMMENTS
APPnAL AND EBRROR-DUROTG TEFm AT WHICH JUDGMENT is RENDmm
on MOTION ron Nuv TRAL OVERRULED, CRnoorr CoURTS PowER TO GBANT

APPEAL Is ExoLusIVE.-(Civil Code of Practice, Section 342). On May
9, W recovered in the circuit court a judgment for money. An appeal
to the Kentucky Court of Appeals was granted by this court May 28
and a supersedeas bond was executed before the clerk on the same date
and supersedeas issued. A transcript of the record was filed with the
clerk of the Court of Appeals on September 21 (which was within the
time prescribed by Civil Code of Practice, section 738), but instead of
prosecuting the appeal granted by the circuit court, as he might have
done, the appellant sought and was granted an appeal by the clerk of
the Court of Appeals. Held, circuit court's power to grant an appeal is
exclusive during the term in which judgment is rendered. Wermeling
v. Wermeling, 224 Ky. 107, 5 (2nd) S. W. 893.
This case is a reaffirmance of what appears to be the settled doctrine in Kentucky. A motion in the Court of Appeals will lie to compel
the judge of the circuit court to grant an appeal so long as the term
has not yet expired. KeUly v. Toney, 95 Ky. 338, 25 S. W. 264. An appeal granted by the clerk of the Court of Appeals during the term of
the circuit court in which the judgment is granted is absolutely void.
Schmidt v. Mitchell, 95 Ky. 334, 25 S. W. 278. An appeal from a judgment can only be granted by the court rendering the judgment during
the term the judgment was rendered. Daugherty v. Central Trust Co.
155 Ky. 380, 159 S. W. 777. Also see American Accident Co. v. Reigart,
92 Ky. 142, 17 S. W. 280 and City of Newport v. Newport Gaslight Go.,
92 Ky. 445, 17 S. W. 435. The rule also seems to be well settled as laid
down by the court in the case at bar that "after the expiration of the
term of the circuit court at which the judgment was rendered, or became final, the exclusive right to grant an appeal rests with the clerk
of the Court of Appeals." See authorities supra, and Wearen v. Smith,
80 Ky. 216.
Section 734 of the Kentucky Code provides, "The mode of bringing
the judgment of an inferior court to the Court of Appeals for reversal
or modification, shall be an appeal, which shall be granted, as matter
of right, to a party or privy against a party or privy, by the cburt
rendering the judgment, on motion made during the term at which it Is
rendered, or thereafter by the clerk of the Court of Appeals, on application of either party or his privy, upon filing in the office of said clerk a
copy of the judgment from which he appeals."
The rule in the case at bar is that the power to grant an appeal Is
exclusive with the circuit court during the term in which the judgment
is rendered. The code supra, section 734 provides that the appeal shall
be granted by the court rendering the judgment during the term at
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which the judgment is rendered. The code in the sapne section provides how the appeal shall be granted after the term expires. It therefore appears that the case at bar simply states the law of Kentucky as
provided in Civil Code of Practice, section 734.
G. C. R.
BILS AN-D NoTES-OmIsSIoN ok PROPF-U PRoNoUN Ir BLANK SPACES
ON PRmTED NoTEs DID NOT RENDER THEm NONNEGOTIABLE So AS TO
IWA AssiGNon NECESSARY PARTY To AcTxoN THEREON (Ky. STATS., SEO.
3720b-17; CIM CODE OF PRACTICE, SEC. 19).-Appellant received eleven
promissory notes from the payee, all the notes having a common payee,
and all bearing the proper indorsement. In a suit against appellee,
(the maker of the notes), a special demurrer by the appellee was upheld on the grounds that appellant was not a holder in due course because the blanks in the face of the notes were not filled, making them
incomplete and nonnegotiable, thereby making the assignor a necessary
party to the suit. The appellant declined to plead further and the
court on appeal held, that under Kentucky Statutes, section 3720b-17, a
failure to insert pronoun "I' or "we" left therefor on printed notes,
was immaterial and their negotiability was not interfered with so as
to make the assignor a necessary party plaintiff under Civil Code of
Practice, section 19. Security Investment Co. of St. Louis v. Harrod
Bros., 225 Ky. 13, 7 (2nd) S. W. 492.
The rile was well established before the Negotiable Instruments
Law, that where a party signed his name to a blank bill or note, either
as drawer, maker or endorser, and delivered it to another, he thereby
made the holder his agent to fill up the blanks, not Inconsistent with
the character of the paper, and did not thereby impair the negotiability
of the paper. Sowders & Co. v. Citizens' National Bank of Lancaster,
12 Ky. Law Rep. 356; Smith v. Hockridge, 8 Bush 423; Light v, KiUnger, 16 Ind. A. 102, 44 N. E. 760, 59 Am. St. Rep. 313; Parker V.
Roberts, 140 Ill. 9, 29 N. E. 668.
The Negotiable Instruments' Lpw is merely declaratory of the
common law as regards omissions on the face of a note. Diamond DistiZeries Co. v. Gott, 137 Ky. 585, 126 S. W. 131, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 643.
The Kentucky Negotiable Instruments Law provides that where an instrument is wanting in any material particular, the person in possession thereof has prima facie authority to complete it by filling up the
blanks therein. Section 3720b-14, Kentucky Statutes.
In light of this section of the Negotiable Instruments Law, section
19 of the Civil Code of Procedure, providing for suits where a chose In
action is assigned, does not apply.
In the present case, the court was directed by the arbitrary law of
the statute and could not have reached a different conclusion. The
negotiable instruments statute, by adopting the rule of the common law,
merely added emphasis to an already well settled rule of the courts.
H. C. C.

CASS COMMENTS
CONSTrIUTIONAL L&w-IN ABsECac or OBJECTION BY DEFNDANTS,
JUSTICE OP THE PAcE PRESIDING IN MISDEMEANOR CASES M.AY TAx COSTS
AGAINST DEFmNDANTS ON ComacTioN.-Facts do not appear in detail.
The case comes up for a consideration of several questions of law, under
the Declaratory Judgment Act, dealing with the constitutionality of
Senate Bil No. 153, entitled, "An act to repeal section 1736 Kentucky
Statutes." The question of chief interest here is entirely apart from
the above statute, dealing solely with the defendants' rights under the
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV. Held: where a defendant on final trial for a misdemeanor fails to seasonably object to being
tried by a justice of the peace or a county judge, the latter may tax his
costs against him on conviction. Judge Adams v. Slavin, 225 Ky. 137,
1. (2d) S. W. 836.
In general the same problem was considered in the recent cases of
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 50 A. L. R. 1243, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed.
749, and Wagers v. Sizemore, 222 Ky. 306, 300 S. W. 918, 16 Kentucky
Law Journal 348. These cases hold that the defendant has a right to
object to being tried by a judge who is financially interested in his
conviction and that to try him after a seasonable objection is to deprive
him of due process of law. The instant case adopts this rule, but goes
further and explains that the right can be waived and that a failure to
affirmatively object will amount to a waiver.
The solution of the problem rests upon a consideration of three
questions: First, what is the nature of the objection? The basis of the
objection is that a defendant has a right to be tried by, an unprejudiced
and uninfluenced judge, and that his right to participate in the fine
only on conviction is apt to have a disparaging influence. The objection, then, is in the nature of an objection on account of prejudice. In the
case of Hargis v. Commonwealth, 135 Ky. 578, 123 S. W. 239, the court
decided that such an objection raises a question of jurisdiction and to
be available must be made before an appearance or a submission to any
motions preliminary to trial. Secondly, can a defendant waive a constitutional right? This point has been decided affirmatively many
times. Bates v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. 338, 227 S. W. 472; Bonar v.
Commonwealth, 180 Ky. 338, 202 S. W. 676; Hargis v. Commonwealth,
135 Ky. 578, 123 S. W. 239. Thirdly, what will amount to a waiver?
Upon this point rests the justice of the case, though the instant case
gives it little consideration. This point was not raised in either the
Tumey or the Wager cases for in both there had been an objection
before trial. The answer to the second question apparently applies
here but does not, there being the question of constitutional rights. In
thecase of Howard v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 10, 80 S. W. 618, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals said that there are many rights guaranteed
by the constitution which one charged with crime cannot waive 5nd
should not be permitted by the court to waive. Then as to the particular right here in question the court said in Bx parte Baer, 20 F. (2d)
912, for the district of Kentucky, in a parallel case, that to hold that
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the defendant had waived his rights would be arbitrary and unwarranted.
In conclusion, it would seem, that the Kentucky Court will hold
that silence will amount to a waiver.
There is at least dicta to that
.effect in Martin, County Judge v. Wyatt, 225 Ky. 212, 7 (2d) S. W.
1048, wherein the court said that the defendant can waive the right,
and in the absence of an objection, there Is no reason why the county
judge should not try him. The Baer case is in direct conflict with the
above cited case, but will probably not be followed In Kentucky. The
Wyatt case is the more recent.
The Federal court rule Is expressed In the Baer and Tumey cases.
There are at present seven states wherein the practice of allowing
justices of the peace and judges of other similar courts to tax their
costs against the defendants prevails, namely, Georgia, Arkansas, Kentucky, Texas, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Ohio. The general rule
seems to be that the amount which the judge will get is so small that it
is very unlikely to prevent a fair trial and that the oath of office will
counterbalance any temptation. The Tumey and Wagers cases have
set forth a new rule which will no doubt finally prevail.
W. H. C.

CRIMINAL LA--DEFENDANT

MAY NOT PRovE His

REPuTATIoN Fon

TRUTH BY SuBsT -ANIV TESTIMONY TO ESTABLISH INNOcENcE.-A. was

indicted and tried upon a charge of wilfully murdering T. upon which
charge he was acquitted. The Commonwealth appealed in order to get
a certification of the law upon two rulings of the trial court which it
was contended were erroneously made to the prejudice of the prosecution. One ruling complained of and the one of greater interest was
the aamission of substantial proof introduced by defendant to establish
his reputation for truth and veracity when there had been no attempt
on the part of the Commonwealth to impeach his truth and veracity.
Commonwealth v. Ashcraft, 224 Ky. 203, 5 (2nd) S. W. 1067.
The doctrine of the case under consideration is the recognized doctrine of the state and federal jurisdictions. At one time evidence of good
,character was held to be admissible on behalf of the defendant in capital
cases only. State v. Parker,7 La. An. 83 (1852); State v. Northrupt, 48
La. 583, 30 Am. Rep. 408 (1878). At the present day, however, the settled
law is that the defendant may introduce such evidence in all criminal
cases where the object is to punish the offender for the crime. 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 25; Searway v. United States, 184 Fed. 716
(1910) ;Harperv. U. S., 170 Fed. 385 (1909) ; Young v. Commonwealth, 6
Bush (Ky.) 312 (1869); Sinclair v. State, 67 Miss. 330, 39 So. 522 (1905);
Gibson et al. v. State, 89 Ala. 121, 8 So. 98 (1890). In State v. 2orthrupt, supra, it was said that it was error to instruct the jury that evidence of good character is of but slight weight and entitled to but little
consideration. Such reasoning is logical and just. Good character of
citizens is the essential basis upon which alone can rest any solid superstructqre.
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The courts place two limitations upon the introductions of "good
character evidence" in crialinal cases. These limitations are: (1) The
crime itself must be an assault upon the particular trait of defendant's
character which he seeks to establish by the substantive testimony, and
(2) the substantive testimony must be Introduced by the defendant
himself and not by the prosecution.
The first limitation is the basis of the decision in the case at bar.
The defendant was allowed to introduce substantive testimony of truth
and veracity to defeat a charge of murder. The evidence of truth and
veracity has no bearing whatever on the charge of murder. If the
trait of character in issue had been one of truth and veracity then the
testimony would have been allowed. This seems to be the universal
view. State v. Moyer, 58 W. Va. 146, 52 S. E. 30 (1905); State v.
Bessa, 115 La. 259, 38 So. 985; Ching Sing v. U. S., 36 Pac. 205 (1894);
Combs v. Commonwealth, 160 Ky. 386, 169 S. W. 879 (1914); Strong v.
Commonwealth, 216 Ky. 98 (1926). The court in Combs v. Commonwealth, supra, said that evidence concerning the character of a defendant in a criminal prosecution, when offered only for the purpose of
affecting his credibility as a witness, ml~st not be confused with evidence of defendant's character offered for the purpose of creating or
supporting an inference that he did or did not commit the crime with
which he is charged and for which he is on trial.
The second limitation is also universally followed. Owens v. Commonwealth, 222 Ky. 524, 184 S. W. 498 (1918); U. S. v. Carrigo, 1
Cranch. C. C. 49 (1802); Gordon v. U. S., 25 Fed. 53 (1918); State v.
Baird, 195 Mo. 9 S. W. 1010, 271 (1917); Wagner v. State, 219 S. W. 471,
87 Tex. Cr. R. 17 (1920).
The Federal court view Is wholly in accord with the state courts'
views. Ching Sing v. United States, supra; Gordon v. United States,
supra; Harperv. United States, supra; Searway v. United States, supra.
W. C. W.

HUSBAND AND W -- MA
_IED
WoMIAN COMMTr=u
CnMX
COX:OINTLY w=TH, o IN THE FPESENcE OF, HUSBAND, is NoT PmsumD Co
imcn.-Appellant, conjointly with her husband, killed her sister. There
was not a scintilla of evidence that appellant acted under her husband's
coercion. Appellant alleged as error failure of the trial court to Instruct that if appellant, at the time of the killing, was acting under the
coercion of her husband she was entitled to an acquittal. Held, that
where there Is not a scintilla of evidence that a wife is acting under
her husband's coercion when committing a crime conjointly with him or
in his presence, the court is not obliged to instruct on that point. Wireman v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 116, 5 (2nd) S. W. 884.
It appears that the Kentucky Statutes, sections 2127, 2128, have
changed the common law rule that "marriage unites husband and wife
into one person." This doctrine no longer serves as a -means by which
married women may escape punishment for crimes committed
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conjointly with or in the presence of their husbands., There fhust be
afirmative evidence of a husband's influence. It is no longer a question of fact, but of law. King v. City of Owensboro, 187 Ky. 21, 218 S.
W. 297; Bevins v. Commonwealth, 204 Ky. 444, 268 S. W. 1063; Temmev
v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 552, 267 S. W. 1087; Anderson v. CoJmonwealth, 211 Ky. 726, 277 S. W. 1009.
The sections of the statutes referred to do not expressly deal with
the question in review, or with any criminal matter, but they have
ohanged the status of married women, and such change of status, the
courts have ruled determinative of the point in question. In the case
of King v. City of Owensboroi supra, the court, in substance, said that
it cannot be conceived that the legislature intended to grant to those
for whom the statutes were instituted (married women) benefits derived therefrom and not exact from same the obligations thereby incurred.
There is a heterogeneous array of holdings upon the point passed
upon by the instant court. The rule of each state is predicated upon
its particular statute. We find three general types of statutes: (1)
Statutes wholly emancipating married Nyomen, as in Kentucky-such
states, by a majority rule, hold that there is a presumption of coercion,
but that it may he rebutted by slight evidence. United States v. Terry,
42 Fed. 317; State v. Cleve, 59 Mo. 298, 8 Am. Rep. 422; Crommonweaqth
v. Adams, 186 Mass. 16r, 71 N. E. 78; State v. Stoner, 189 Iowa 1304, 179
N. W. 867; Morton v. Tenn., 141 Tenn. 357, 209 S. W. 644. (2) Statutes
enlarging married women's rights. These states adhere to the common
law rule. Neyes v. Taylor, 12 S. Dak. 488, 81 N. W. 901. (3) Statutes
expressly abrogating the common law rule of coercion. In such instances the express tenor of the act Is followed. Bell v. State, 92 Ga.
49, 18 S. E. 186.
State v. Ma. Foo, 110 Mo. 7, 19 S. W. 222, and Wompler v. Corpordtion of Norton, 134 Virginia 606, 113 S. E. 733, are in accord with the
principal case.
It can be seen from the authorities that the instant court IA Its
holding only reiterated a well established Kentucky rule, but in doing
so it concurred with the minority view under similar statutes. The
holding, though a minority one, seems sound on principle, consistent,
C. M.
and desirable In its results.
INSANrrY-UxovERxABLE

PAssIoIq DoEs NoT CoNsTrrUTE INSANITY.

-The defendant killed his mistress in a fit of anger because she would
not return to their illicit relations. Insanity was not relied on as a defense but it was urged on behalf of the defendant that since his testimony showed that he acted in a jealous frenzy and under influence of an
Irresistible Impulse, the court should have submitted the question of his
mental capacity to the jury. Held, that ungovernable passion does not
constitute insanity and that it is the duty of one whose will power is

CASE CoMNTSnot impaired by disease to govern and control his passions. Howard.
v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 224, 5 (2nd) S. W. 1056.
TIhe case most relied upon by the court in reaching this conclusion
and which represents 'the great weight of authority upon the question
is Fitzpatrickv. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 357, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 363. This
case expresses the doctrine that although the accused was at the time
of the commission of the deed acting under the influence of an Irresistible impulse such does not constitute insanity nor does it excuse the
accused for his act.
The test in such cases, as laid down by McCarthy v. Commonwealth,
114 Ky. 620, 71 S. W. 656, and cited by the court, is that Insanity is the
effect of mental disease and that mental disorder will excuse crime only
when caused by mental disease. By this rule acts which are uncontrollable because of the passionate or ungovernable temper of the accused will not-be excused unless the existence of actual mental disease
Is shown.
In English law this test found its first expression In McNaughtews
Case, 10 Clark & F. 200, and since that decision the English courts
have universally recognized the doctrine and adopted the test. Greenleaf reflects this attitude of the English courts by recognizing the
mental disease test in 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, Section 373, where he
says:
"If it Is proved that the mind of the accused was in a diseased and
unsound state, the question will be whether the disease existed to so
that the prisoner acted from an irresistible
high a degree, . .
and uncontrollable impulse."
In the United States, the doctrine of the principal case represents
the almost uncontradicted weight of authority. State v. Brandenburg,
151 Iowa 197, 130 N. W. 1065;' Commonwealth v. Coolfer, 219 Mass. 1,
106 N. E. 545; Commonwealth v. Renzo, 216 Pa. 147, 65 A. 30; Anderson
.
R. M. O.
v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 320, 148 S. W. 802
INSURANcE-As OPEnATioN OF STILL IN INSURED BumN INCREASED
WORDS, "W ncH INCREASED THE HAZARD, . . . IP You FIND

HAZARD,

THE HAZARD WAS SO INCREASED," SHOULD BE OMITTED FROM INSTRUCTION

an action on a fire policy against the defendant insuroN Rnr:.-In
ance company, the defense was that a clause in the policy had been
violated by keeping of a still on the insured premises. Instructions to
the jury were, " . . . that you should find for the plaintiff,
unless you believe from the evidence that the moonshine still was
located and operated in the sheet and metal building as described in
the proof, and was installed or operated there . . . which increased
the hazard to the property by fire, if you find the hazard was so increased, then the law is for the defendants." Held: Judgment for detendant was reversed; the court was ordered to strike from its instructions the words "which increased the hazard to the property by fire,
If you find the hazard was so increased;" that the operation of the
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moonshine still increased the hazard to the property. No regular insurance company would take such a risk. Colked v. Conn. Fire Ins.
Go., 224 Ky. 837, 7 (2nd) S. W. 837.
There seems to be very little, if any, authority upon the question
as to whether the operation of a moonshine still in the insured premises
can be held as a matter of law to increase the hazard or risk to the
premises. Generally, the question whether there has been an increase
of the hazard in violation of a provision that such increase will avoid
the policy, is a question for the jury. .Adair v. Southern Mutual Ins.
Co., 107 da. 297, 33 S. E. 78, 45 L. R. A. 204; Orient Ins. Co. v. McKnight,
197 Il1. 190, 64 N. E. 339; Russell v. Cedar Rapids Ins. Co., 71 Iowa 69,
32 N. W. 95; Curry v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 10 Pick. 535, 20 Amer.
Dec. 547; Phoenix Ass. Co. v. Franklin Brass Co., 58 Fed. 166. But
where the policy specifies certain acts as constituting an Increase of
hazard or risk, such as to avoid the policy, and the facts are not in dispute there is no question for the jury. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Davis, 9 lKy. Law Rep. 933; North American Fire Ins. Co. v. Throop, 22
Mich. 146, 7 Amer. Rep. 638; Taylor v. Security Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 88
Minn. 231, 92 N. W. 952; Schuerman v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 161 Ill.
437, 43 N. E. 1093, 52 Am. St. Rep. 377. It does not appear in the present
case that the insurer stipulated specifically against operation or location of a moonshine still in the insured premises or against illegal use
of the premises, therefore the last stated general rule would have no
application.
As previously stated, there seem to be practically no reported
cases upon the question of whether operation of a moonshine still in
the Insured premises Increases the risk as a matter of law. It is
obvious that very few cases would have arisen on the specific point involved prior to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. Likewise,
that operation of a still, in contravention of law, with the attendant
moral as well as physical hazard from the use of fire with which to run
the still, Is so obvious an increase of hazard that it would be a waste
of time to adjudicate the question. We have found one case directly
in point. Coffaro v. Queen Ins. Co. of America, 216 N. Y. S. 564, 217
App. Div. 197, which held that ordinarily, question of increase of hazard
within fire insurance policy Is one of fact, but installation of stills and
storing of large quantities of alcohol was increase as matter of law.
Nor will the appropriation of the premises to an illegal use, without
the knowledge of the insured, avoid a policy containing no provision on
the subject. Nebraska& Iowa Ins. Co. v. 4jhristiansen,29 Nebr. 572, 45
N. W. 924, 26 A. S. R. 407; Hall v. Peo. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 6 Gray
(Mass.) 185; Lochner v. Home Mitt. Ins. Co., 17 Mo. 247. And see
Vance on Insurance, Chapter. 12, Section 165, page 462, approving the
general rule that the provision, "If the hakard be increased by auy
means within the control or knowledge of the insured" is not violated
by the act of the insured's tenant, or other agent, In increasing the
risk, provided that act is not known to the insured.
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In the case of Mercantile Ins. Go. of London and Edin. v. Urnion. Stc.

Yards Co., 120 Ky. 465, 87 S. W. 285, the Court approved an instruction
which stated that "rags stored upon the said premises

. .

. which

increased the hazard .....
." By analogy it would seem that the
instant case is a much stronger one in favor of a like instruction.
We conclude that upon well reasoned principle, if not by virtue of
a long line of cases, the question under discussion was not for the jury.
C. E. B.
INTOXICATING LIquoRs-EvvENCE
DEFENDANT
WITHOUT

OF

PARAPHERNALIA

MERELY

SUFFICIENT

SHOWING ACTUAL MANUFACTURE

SHOWING POSSESSION BY
TO

MANUFACTURE

LIQUOR

HELD INSUFFICIENT TO Go To

THE Juay.-Defendant was indicted and convicted on the charge of
manufacturing intoxicating liquor. At the trial it was shown that a
still and a quantity of mash were found, but there was no evidence to
show that the mash was in such a process of fermentation as to cause
intoxication. The defendant's reputation as a participant in the
whiskey traffic was bad. No evidence was introduced by the defense
and a peremptory instruction for acquittal was requested. The court's
failure to give such an instruction was the error complained of on
appeal. Held, that the mere possession of paraphernalia sufficient to
manufacture intoxicating liquor is insufficient to support a charge of
manufacturing liquor. Starks v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 221, 5 (2nd)
S. W. 1051.
In the case of Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 218 K1y. 593, 291 S. W. 1012,
the Court of Appeals held that the possession of a quantity of corn beer
by defendant, together with a bad reputation, was insufficient to support
a charge of manufacturing. The Court said: "To sustain a charge of
manufacturing intoxicating liquor, it is necessary for the Commonwealth to show either by direct or circumstantial evidence that the
accused actually made intoxicating liquor." This rule was expressed
in Bartley v. Commonwealth, 215 Ky. 850, 287 S. W. 22, which upon the
facts seems to be precisely in point with the instant case. There it was
held that the possession of a cap, a worm, and some beer, without the
discovery of any actual whiskey, was insufficient to support a similar
charge. The evidence could hardly be stronger, except by the presence
of actual whiskey. Other cases which sustain the rule are Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 210 Ky. 398, 276 S. W. 125; Keel v. Commonwealth, 216
Ky. 63, 287 S. W. 222; Brockman v. Commonwealth, 217 Ky. 588, 290
S. W. 315. In all the cases it is difficult to determine just what the
court means by circumstantial evidence when it says that it is 'necessary to show by direct or circumstantial evidence that the accused
made intoxicating liquor. It must be admitted that the facts in the
principal case and in Bartley v. Commonwealth, supra, seem to afford
some circumstantial evidence.
The rule in other jurisdictions seems to be the subject of some conflict of authority. In Hughes v. State, 133 Miss. 1, 90 So. 515, it was
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held that evidence merely showing that defendant had a still, and was
preparing to manufacture liquor, the inference bbing that he had other
materials on: hand, was insufficient to go to the jury to support a charge
of manufacturing. But in another jiirisdiction it has been held that
evidenc6 that defendants were preparing to manufacture whiskey, and
had on hand a still and mash for such purposes, is sufficient to support
a conviction. Williams v. State, 159 Ark. 170, 251 S. W. 370. So, the
Federal courts seem inclined to give a loose construction to statutes
prohibiting simply the manufacture of liquor, for it has been held that
the finding of whiskey, molasses, meal, and an iron pot was sufficient
evidence to sustain conviction. Smiling v.. United States, 258 Fed. 235.
It did not appear in the case that any still was found.
It is submitted that since in most jurisdictions, including Kentucky, (See Kentucky Statutes, 1926 Supp., sees. 2554al-2554a4) it is
made a crime to possess apparatus for manufacturing intoxicating
liquor, the statutes prohibiting manufacturing should be strictly construed. Otherwige, if possession of apparatus and materials sufficient
to manufacture liquor is construed as manufacturing the same, then
the statutes prohibiting the mere possession of such apparatus and materials are surplusage and mere repetition. Upon principle the court
in the instant case seems to be unquestionably right in holding the eviW. C. S.
dence insufficient.
LICENSES-GAsoLINE

PURCHASED

IN

ANOTHER

OPERATING A FERnr BETWEEN STATES, HELD

STATE AND

USED

IN

TAxAR.F-.-Defendants, who

were doing business under a firm name, were residents of Illinois with
their principal place of business and situs of personal property in that
state. They were operating a ferry between a Kentucky and an Illinois
port and all the gasoline so used was purchased in Illinois. Kentucky
sought to tax the gasoline used in the operation of this ferry under
section 4224b-1, Kentucky Statutes Supp. which provided, "Any person
who shall purchase or obtain gasoline without the state aild sell, distribute or use the same within the state," should be subject to a specified
tax. Defendant attacks the constitutionality of the statute under Section 171 Kentucky Constitution which provides: "Taxes-shall be uniform upon all property of the same class," also, under that provision of
the Federal Constitution (Article 1, Section 8) which provides that all
indirect taxes shall be uniform. Held, that the statute was not contrary to the provisions of the constitution. Metropolis Ferry Co. v.
Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 45, 7 (2nd) S. W. 506.
The defendant did not charge the legislature with any arbitrary
abuse of discretion nor did he attack the regularity of the proceedings
under the statute, but contended that a tax on the use of the property
was in essence a tax on the property itself and therefore came within
the uniformity provision of the constitution.
In Dawson v. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 225 U. S.
228, 41 S. Ct. 272, 65 L. Ed. 638, the Supreme Court said: "To lay a tax
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by reason of the ownership of property is to tax the property." Such
a tax would necessarily fall within the uniformity provisions of the
state and federal constitutions. This view was followed by the Kentucky Court in Craig, Auditor v. B. H. Taylor, Jr. & Sons, 192 Ky. 36,
232 S. W. 395. But in neither case was the right to tax the use of the
property involved.
The United States Supreme Court has declared valid a Federal
statute distinguishing between the use and ownership of property for
the purposes of taxation. In this decision the court laid down the rule
that the mere fact that equality, to the extent of mathematical niceties,
does not always result, is not a question of power but of legil~ative discretion and so long as this discretion Is not arbitrary and unreasonable, it Is beyond the scope of Judicial cognizance. Billings v. United
States, 232 U. S. 261, 34 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 596.
In Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642, 65 L. Ed. 1189, the
Supreme Court upheld a similar act of the legislature of New Mexico
under an almost identical constitutional provision saying: "We see no
reason to 4loubt the power of the State to select this commodity, as distinguished from others, in order to impose an excise tax upon its sale
and use, and since the tax operates impartially upon all, and with territorial uniformity throughout the state, we deem it 'equal and uniform
upon the subjects of taxation of the same kind! "
From the above cited decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
to which all constitutional questions must 'ultimately be referred, it
seems clear that the ownership and use of property may be separated,
by the legislature, for the purposes of taxation. And so long as the tax
operates impartially and with territorial uniformity it in no wise contravenes such . constitutional provisions. The court therefore, in the
instant case, is in accord with the settled policy of the law in granting
the legislature the power to make such classifibations foi7 the purpose
of taxation.
T. C. B.
LMITATioN oF ACTION-STATUTE BEGsNS TO RoN AGAINST NOTE PAYABLE o DEMAND Fno DATE OF THE INsTRUmENT.-Appellee, on 3anuary
1, 1905, executed two promissory demand notes to one Hodges. On
April 16, 1927, appellant, the administrator of Hodge's estate, brought
suit to collect on the notes. Appellee plead in answer that each of the
notes was barred by the statute of limitations of 15 years. A demurrer
to each of the answers was overruled by the lower court, and on appeal
the upper court held, that by the great weight of authority, the statute
of limitations begins to run from the date of a demand note. Hodges,
Adm'r v. Asher, 220 Ky. 431, 6 (2nd) S. W. 451.
The reason for this rule is that a note of this character Is due at
once and no demand is necessary, the suit being in the nature of a demand. St. Charles Having's Bank v. Thompson, 284 Mo. 72, 88, 223 S.
W. 734. This same rule applies to notes "payable on demand after
date." Gerke Brewing Co. v. Brusse, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 322; O'Neil v.
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Magner, 81 Cal. 631, 22 Pac. 876, 15 Am. St. Rep. 88; Fenno v. Gray, 146
Mass. 118, 15 N. E. 87.
Section 410 of the Civil Code of Procedure of New York State provides that when a right exists but a demand is necessary to entitle one
to maintain an action, the time within Which the action must have
commenced must be computed when the right to make the demand accrued. The statute necessarily commenced to run from the date of the
note. Sewel v. Swift, 151 Apt. Div. 584, 588, 136 N. Y. S. 371.
The South Carolina court has held that the statute of limitations
does not run on a due bill, payable on demand, until after demand has
been made. Nash v. Woodward, 62 S. C. 418, 40 S. E. 895. This decision completely ignores earlier holdings to the contrary. Wilkes v.
Robinson, 37 S. 0. L. 172; Smith v. Blythewood, 24 S. C. L. 245, 33 Am.
D. 111.
A note running for an indefinite period of time is in law a demand
note and is payable when the promise is made, thus incurring the running of the statute of limitations at that time. Krecht v. Bashold, 138
Ill. App. 430.
The great weight of authority supports the holding in the principal
case which from a practical viewpoint appears to be unquestionably
correct. If such a holding were not adhered to the statute of limitations
might be suspended for any length of time in the case of a demand note.
H. C. C.
Lnm5ATIosx OF AcTioNs-Sunrxy's CAUSE or ACTION AGAINST PInrMcPAT Arn PAY3MENT OF A NOT ]BY SunR=T HELD AcTioN ow "TRANsrEnnFn
NoTn Wrmrmn

FTima

YEAB LnnrTAmO

STATUTE.

(Ky.STATS.,

SECS.

2514, 4665, 4666).-C as principal and R as surety-executed to M a promissory note. R paid the note and, after maturity, took an assignment
from M. After C's death R sued the administrator of his estate on the
note. Defendant pleads the statute barring a personal action unless
instituted within five years. Held: Plaintiff's action was on the transferred note and hence not within the five-year limitation. Redford v.

Crowe's Adml', 225 Ky. 142, 7 (2nd) S.W. 842.
The dominant question in this action was, whether or not a surety
upon payment of his principal's note, and an assignment by the payee
to him, succeeds to the rights of the payee on the note or must rely
upon the common-law implied obligation of the principal to reimburse
him the amount paid when he took up the note. Whether or not the
payment of a note by the surety operates so as to extinguish it and thus
prevent the preservation of its vitality by assignment was formerly a
much mooted question, but in Kentucky, before the passage of the "Negotiable Instruments Law" .section 3720b, with subsections, of Kentucky Statutes) the law was well settled that it did not. Joyce v. Joyce,
1 Bush. 474; Stratton v. Heuser, 19 Ky. Law Rep. 1019, 42 S. W. 1133.
But the defendant insisted that under subdivision 1, sections 3720b-119
and 3720-191, Kentucky Statutes (Negotiable Instruments Law) the
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plaintiff is a principal debtor and since he is primarily liable on the
instrument payment by him discharges it.
Professor Chafee in discussing "principal debtor" (Brannan's Negotiable Instruments Law (1926), page 725) as used in these sections
admits that there is much confusion because of no attempted definition
of the -phrase. He concludes, "The words mhay mean either a party primarily liable or a party, who as between himself and another party or
parties to the instrument ought to pay it"
(See also 10 Ill. Law Rev.
277.)
Some. courts have embraced the first interpretation while others
have adopted the latter. If the court, in the instant case, were forced
to choose between them the result might be different. But the court, in
accord with its former view, reiterates the doctrine that section 2514,
Kentucky Statutes, governs the limitation of such actions provided the'
assignment is taken from the principal within five years after payment,
otherwise his right of action terminates in five years. In Sisk v. 'Bisc,
192 Ky. 692, 234 S. W. 296, the court being confronted with this identical problem said, "By assignment he (the surety) was subrogated to all
rights as the owner of the note, that had been possessed by the principal."
Although the court prefers to base its decision on the doctrine
enuctated in,the Sisk case and avoid an application of the Negotiable
Instruments Law to the present state of facts, its decision seems sound
and in accord with those jurisdictions which have applied it. Durham
v. McDowell (Tex. Civ. App.) 265 S. W. 425; Pease v. Syler, 78 Wash.
24, 138 Pac. 310; Pendergrast v. Phillips, 57 Okla. 105, 156 Pac. 1189.
The following states, prior to the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, reached the same result, Mason v. Pierron, 63 Wis. 239, 23
N. W. 119; Ferd,Herin Brewing Co. v. Jordan, 110 Mo. App. 289, 85 S.
W. 927; Nelson v. Webster, 72 Neb. 332, 100 N. W. 411, 68 L. R. A. 513;
Brown v. White, 29 N. J. L. 307, 80 Am. Dec. 226.
A survey of the adjudicated cases convinces us that a well-established precedent, reaching back over a half century almost, precludes
T. C. B.
an American court from attaining a contrary result.
MASTER AND SERVANT-FATHER USING MINOR SON'S EARNINGS IN PAYNG Fon AUTOMOBILE AND SUPPORTING FAxmy HELD "PARTIAL DEPENDENT."

-(Kentucky Statutes, Section 4880-4987). M., a minor, was killed in the
defendant company's mines. His father filed an application before the
Workmen's Compensation Board for compensation. M. was a regular
employee due to the fact that the defendant made specific charges of
him for medical service, etc. M. turned his wages over to his father
and mother to help to support the family of five children and a brotherin-law. M's father took part of the wages to pay for an automobile and
part to support the family. Held, although the father used part to
pay for an automobile and part to support the family, he, nevertheless,
would be a partial dependent. MelcroftCoal Company et al. v. Hicks3,
224 Ky. 173, 5 (2nd) S. W. 1049.
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The problem with which the court was faced was one of partial dependency existing between a minor-and his father. Section 4893, subsection 3, Kentucky Statutes provides: "If there are partly dependent
persons the payments shall be such part of what would be payable for
total dependency as the partial dependency existin,g at the time of the
accident to the employee may be proportionate to total dependency, all
such payments to be made for the period between the date of death and
335 weeks after the date of the accident ,to the deceased employee, or
until the intervening termination of dependency, but in no case to
exceed in the aggregate of compensation on account of such death the
maximum sum of four thousand dollars ($4,000).
"Partial dependency shall be determined by the proportion of the
earnings of the employee which have, been contributed to such partial
dependant during one year next preceding the date of injury; if the
relation of partial dependency shall not have existed for one year next
preceding the date of injury, the board phall consider all the facts and
circumstances and fix such proportion as may be fair and reasonable
thereunder."
It can be seen from this provision that the purpose of it, and the
entire Workmen's Compensation Act, is to provide support and maintenance for those who were dependent totally or -partially upon the
deceased employee in his lifetime. Such was the view expressed by
the court in Penn, et al v. Penn, 183 Ky. 228, 209 S. W. 53.
In the case at bar the court said "that necessary support does not
mean a modicum, merely covering the bare necessities of life, -but it
means an income sufficient to afford the family the character of living
had and enjoyed by others- in the same class and station of life. This
seems to be the view universally followed in the United States and also
in foreign countries. Peabody Coal Company v. Industrial Commission,
143 N. E. (Il1.) 90 (1924); Clover Fork Coal Company v. Ayres, 219 Ky.
326, 292 S. W. 803; Benjamin F. Shaw Company v. Pa7matory, 105 A.
(Del.) 417 (1919); Hotel Bond Company's Appeal, 89 Conn. 143, 93 A.
245 (1915); Simmons v. White Brothers, 80 L. T. 344 (1919); Lee v.
The Bessa, 1 K. B. 83 (1912); New Monckton Colleries v. Kelling, A. C.
648 (1911).
Under the Kentucky Statutes, it is not necessary that the parent
be totally dependent upon the child. It does not matter if the parent
may have other means of support. The parent may have an earning
power himself. Mere ability on part of the parent to earn a livelihood
does not show that there is no dependency. The test is: Were the contributions used for the support of the family, and were they necessary,
the claimant's station in life being considered. Clover Fork Coal 0o1pany v. Ayres, supra; Benjamin F. Shaw Company v. Palmatory, supra;
Roc7 Island Bridge and I2:on Works Company v. Industrial Commission,
122 N. E. (Ill.) 30 (1919). The parent may be a property owner and
yet be a partial dependent. Re Carter, 221 Mass. 105, 108 N. E. 91
(1915) ; State, ex rel., Splady v. District Court, 128 Minn. 338, 151 N. W.
123 (1915).
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The most interesting point in the case at bar lies in the statement
of the court to the effect that, sin~e aiitomobiles are in common use and
a convenience if not a necessity In claimant's station of life, there is
no good -reason why' the minor might not voluntarily contribute part of
his wages to assist in paying for such machine and its upkeep.
W. C. W.
MUNIOIPAL CORPORATIoNs--Crry CANNOT EXERCISE POLx0h: POWER IN

NLEsS RiGnT HAS BiEN GIVEN ny LEGisLTR~n.-Plaintiff, owner of a certain city lot, asks for mandamus to
compel the city building inspector to take action relative to issuing a
permit for the erection of a gas station on the plaintiff's land. The
permit was originally refused on the ground that it was in violation of
the city zoning ordinances. Held, that city could not exercise police
power in enacting zoning ordinances unless right had been given by
legislature. This right they held to b6 conferred by Kentucky Statutes,
Section 2742 and 2783. Fowler v. Obier, City Building Inspector, 224
Ky. 742, 7 (2nd) S. W. 219.

EHNAoTING ZO1nNG ORDINAN CE

The general rule which represents the weight of authority today is
that -the police power resides in the State legislature and that it may be
exercised by municipal corporations only so far as it has been expressly
or impliedly delegated. People, ex rel., City of New Orleans v. Western
2New York and Pennsylvania Traction Co., 214 N. Y. 526, 108 N. E. 847;
State v. Dannenburg, 150 N. C. 799, 63 N. E. 946; Waller v. Osban, 60
Fla. 268, 52 So. 970. These cases also hold that in applying this general
rule the delegation of. the police power in question must be clearly
shown and that any doubt concerning such delegation should be resolved against the municipality.
An unusual solution to the problem is offered by the charter of the
city of Baltimore which delegates to the city the same and equal police
power which the State enjoys. R. B. Construction Go. v. Jackson, 137
Atl. 278.
The decision in the instunt case that the law in Kentucky is in accord with the general rule is neither novel nor contradictory to pre-vious decisions in this State. United Fuel and Gas Co. v. Commonwealth, 159 Ky. 34, 166 S. W. 783; City df Morganfiel7d v. Wathen, 202
Ky. 641, 261 S. W. 12; Wells v. Town of Mt. Olivet, 126 Ky. 131, 102 S.
W. 1182. The statement of this rule was dicta, being merely a step in
the reasoning of the case since the court held such police power to have
been delegated to the city by Kentfcky Statutes, Sections 2742 and
2783. It nevertheless furnishes a concise statement of the law as it is
R. M. 0.
in Kentucky and the general weight of authority today.
POWERS-ESTAT IN FEE AND PowEn APPENDANT MAY SUBSIST IN TE
SAm PERso.-A man by will devised to his daughter K. his house and
lot "for and during her natural life, free from the control of any husband she may have, with power in my said daughter to dispose of said
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house and lot by will at her death to whom she may desire." The
daughter was the sole heir and distributee at law, and later she married.
She and her husband conveyed the property to X, with general warranty of title, who in turn conveyed to the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs entered
into a contract with defendant, whereby they agreed to convey the said
property with a good fee simple title. Defendant declined to take the
property, and this action was brought under the Declaratory Judgment
Act to determine the rights of the parties. Held, that the power given
the daughter was a power appendant, which may subsist with an estate
in fee in the same person, and which was extinguished by the subsequent conveyance of the interest to which the power was appendant.
Mountjoy v. Kasselman, 225 Ky. 55, 7 S. W. (2nd) 512.
Under the statute of descent and distribution (Kentucky Statutes,
secs. 1393-1408) the reversion after the life estate vested. in the daughter, and the life estate thereby merged into the fee. HEunt v. PilTlips,
32 Ky. Law Rep. 257, 105 S. W. 445.
A power appendant has been Vlefined as a power depending strictly
upon the estate limited to the person to whom it is given. It is therefore distinguished from a collateral power, which Is a power given to
one with no estate In the land. Sugden, Powers (6th Ed.), p. 23. In
an early English case, Lord Chancellor Thurlow held that a power appendant is merged by the accession of the fee in the same person. Crass
v. Hufdson, 3 Bro,. C. C. 30, 29 Eng. Rep. 169. But this case was later
overruled by the leading case of MaundrelZ v. Maundrell, 10 Ves. Jr., 246,
32 Eng. Rep. 839. There Lord Eldon clearly held, after an extensive
review of the authorities, that a power appendant and a fee can subsist
In the same person. This case is supported by the great weight of authority. Glass v. Richardson, 9 Hare 698, 68 Eng. Rep. 694; Sugden,
Powers (6th Ed.), pp. 56-62; Tiffany, Real Property, Vol. I, p. 1106. See
also Gray, Release and Discharge of Powers, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 513.
This rule seems to be accepted universally, except in states like
New York, where the statutes tend to regard one as having an estate in
fee simple when he is given an absolute power of disposition, which he
may exercise for his own benefit. Tiffany, Real Property, VoL I, p.
1106. In such a jurisdiction the English view is not accepted, and the
power is regarded as non-existent. Hetzel v. Barber, 69 N. Y. 1; Jennings v. Conboy, 73 N. Y. 230. It has been suggested by Tiffany that a
power given to the owner, whether appendant or in gross, would ordinarily be extinguished by his acquisition of the fee simple, not so much
on the theory of merger, as because the purpose of the creation of the
power no longer exists. Real Property, Vol. I, p. 1106.
It Is equally well settled that a power appendant Is extinguished
by a conveyance of the interest to which the power Is appendant. McFall v. Kirkpatrick, 236 Ill. 281, 86 N. E. 139; Gray, Release and Discharge of Powers, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 513; Sugden, Powers (6th Ed.), p.
31. But the common law rule in regard to powers collateral, held by a
stranger who has no interest in the land, is different. They cannot be
extinguished or released. Edwards v. Sleater, Hardr., 410; Farwell,
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Powers, p. 11. .The rule as to such extinguishment of powers appendant rests upon the principle that the donee of the power cannot derogate from his own grant. Leake, Land Law, 383; Gray, Release and Discharge of Powers, supra.
Therefore, in the instant case the power appendant existed along
with the fee in the daughter, and it was extinguished by her conveyance of her interest. Defendant could therefore not complain of the
title offered him. The decision is sound on principle and authority.
W. C. S.
VENDon AND PURCHAsER-ONE RAISING SURFACE OF LOT wAs LIABLE
TO AwJOINING LANDOWNER FOR DAmAGEs Fmc SURFAcE WATER AFTE

SAIET

OF LOT UNTIL PURcmAsER's LIABILITY BECAME FIxED; ALSO, FOR THE REsSONARLn COST OF A WALL ERECTED IN ABATEMENT OF THE NumsANc-Appellee, in improving his lot, adjoining appellant's premises, raised the
surface so as to divert the surface water to the detriment of appellant's
property. Prior to the action appealed from and subsequent to conveyance of property by appellee, a wall was built and injury occurred,
a suit upon which was dismissed by the court below. Held, that lower
court erred; that appellant was entitled to redovery for both items sued
upon; that a grantor's liability for a nuisance continues until his grantee's responsibility becomes fixed. Walter v. Wagoner, 226 Ky. 255, 8
(2d) S. W. 421.
That the court is supported by Kentucky law is well established by
Best and Bros. v. Louisville, C. and L. Ry. Co., 8 Bush (Ky.) 404 and
Central Consumers' Company v. Pinkert, 122 Ky. 720, 92 S. W. 957. There
Is no break in this view in the Kentucky decisions.
The instant case is in accord with the majority rule throughout the
United States. Sloggy v. Dilmarth,38 Minn. 179, 36 N. W. 451; Mansfibld v. Tunney, 202 Mass. 312, 88 N. E. 892; Eastman v. Ameskeag Mfg.
Co., 44 N. H. 143, 82 Am. Dec. 201; Wagoner v. Jrmaine, Denio (N. Y.)
306, 45 Am. Dec. 474.
The liability for a nuisance springs from the one creating it, and
not from the ownership or occupancy of property. Barring v. Common'wealth, 2 Duv. (Ky.) 95; People v. Townsend, 3 Hill (N. Y.) 497; Moore
v. Langdon, 2 Mackey (D. C.) 127, 47 Am. Rep. 262; Birmingham v. Lavonah, 78 Ga. 641, 3 S. E. 274. However, this burden may be shifted to
a subsequent owner if he actively participates in maintenance thereof,
Haynes v. Brewer, 194 Mass. 435, 8 N. E. 503; or fails to abate upon
notification by aggrieved party, Central Trust Co. v. Wabash St. L. and
P. Ry. Co., 57 Fed. 441; Johnson v. Lewis, 13 Conn. 303, 33 Am. Dec. 405.
Notice is not necessary to raise grantee's liability if the nuisance becomes public. Leahan 'v. Cochran, 178 Mass. 566, 60 N. E. 382. Grantor's liability, if once attached, continues until grantee's responsibility
is fixed. Central Consumers' Co. v. Pinkert, supra; Pillsbury v. Moore,
44 Me. 154, 69 Am. Dec. 91. Not being able to go on property to abate
a nuisance bars an action against grantor for subsequent injury. Mans.
field v. Penney, supra.
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That the instant case is in accord with prior Kentucky decisions,
and the overwhelming majority rule, cannot be doubted from the foregoing authorities.
C. S. M.
WrUMs-ESTATE

CONDITIONAL

ON

THE

PFOBSANOE

DUTIES WxIL NOT BE DEFEA.TED BY NOx;-PFORa

I

OF

FUTURE

EC OF CONDITIoNs BE-

THn Dnvisz's CoNmTRoL-In 1876 testator made a will bequeathing
and devising to his wife all his real and personal property for her life,
and at her death to a foster son, the defendant, if he helped support
them during their old age. In 1884 testator died, the will was admitted
to probate, and after living on the estate for about a year, the wife
placed the fosier son with other people, contrary to his wishes. He
was at this time about eleven years of age. In 1902 the wife sold her
life estate to plaintiff, who institutes this action to quiet title. Defendant filed answer, set-off and counterclaim, claiming the fee in remainder by virtue of the will. Plaintiff contended that defendant had
forfeited his rights before he became twenty-one years of age by being
so disobedient and unmanageable that his foster mother had to place
him with other people. Held, where full performance on the parf of
thedevisee has been prevented because of conditions and circumstances
over which he had no control the grant will not be destroyed upoa
failure to comply with a condition subsequent. Boggess v. Grail, 224
Ky. 97, 5 (2d) S. W. 905.
The point decided in this case seems to be well settled In Kentucky.
Where possible the courts will construe such a provision to be a condition subsequent, and nonperformance without fault will not destroy the
estate. Bryant's Admin?"strator v. Dugan, 92 Ky. 627, 18 S. W. 636;
Grubs v. Grubs, 190 Ky. 258, 227 S. W. 272; Irvin v. Irvin, 12 Ky. Law
Rep. 827, 15 S. W. 511; Simmons v. Hessey, 2 Ky. Law Rep. 224. However, where, by the words of the instrument it is impossible to construe
otherwise than conditions precedent, the courts will attempt to find that
there has bben substantial performance: Page v. Fraser,14 Bush (Ky.)
205; also Irvin v. Irvin, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 827, 15 S. W. 511. However,
the courts will not attempt to in any way alter or change the apparent
desire of the testator. If the courts construe the will one way or the
other it will be solely to carry out the testator's intentions and not
because of any subsequent circumstances. Irvin v. Irvin, supra.
The United States Supreme Court rule seems to be well expressed
In Finlay v. King, 3 Peters 346, 7 L. Ed. 701. That whether or not the
conditions are precedent or subsequent is always a question of the Intention of the testator and If the act to be done does not necessarily
precede the vesting of the estate it will be considered a condition subsequent. In Sherman v. American CongregationalAssociation, 113 Fed.
614, the court said, "The condition being subsequent and its performance having been rendered impossible, .....
the legacy became
effective."
Generally the courts of other states follow the rule of this Kentucky case. .Pittsv. Campbell, 173 Alabama 604, 55 So. 505; Jones v.
YOND
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Bramlet, 2 Il. 276. In Martin v. Balou, 3 Barbour (N. Y.) 119, the
court said that failure to comply with a condition precedent without
fault would nevertheless defeat the estate but that a different rule apz
W. H. C.
plied where the condition was subsequent.
Wnms-OiN FAnuER To DEvisE EMPLOYEE PROPERTY FOR SERVICES AS
PnoISED, MEASURE OF RECOVERY IS PROPERTY'S VALUE WHERE VALUE OF
SmvcEs CANNOT REASONiABLY BE F=_D.-Plaintiff lived with deceased
as his housekeeper, performing services incident thereto, and otherwise
caring for him. In return, he promised to leave her a certain house
and lot at his death. On his failure to do so, this action was brought
to recover from the estate the reasonabe value of such services. In
affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, the court said, "Where the plaintiff's services are of such a character that their value may not be reasonably fixed by the jury, then the measure of recovery is the reasonable value of the property. Ecton's Ex'rs v. Vinegar, 225 Ky. 15, 7 (2nd)
S. W. 487.
While with respect to the above case the rule last cited seems to
be more or less dicta, it is nevertheless an accepted rule of law in Kentucky. Berry v. Gradly, 1 Mete. 553- Benge v. Hieatt's Admr., 82 Ky.
666; Broughton v. Broughton, 203 Ky. 695, 262 S. W. 1089; Waters v.
Oline, 85 S. W. 209; Doty's Admr. v. Doty's G'en, 118 Ky. 204, 80 S. W.
803. The rule was first adopted by the Kentucky court in 1859 in the
case of Berry v. Graddy, supra. In that case T induced X, who had
married a niece of T's, whom he had raised and to whom he was very
much attached, to abandon his determination to remove to Mississippi,
and to Incur heavy expenses in the purchase of a farm in Kentucky, by
agreeing verbally to pay $5,000 in three annual installments of the purchase money. T having paid $2,000, died. X was appointed his administrator. The court affirmed X's right of retainer for tbhe balance
of the debt and held that there was a valuable and meritorious consideration for tho promise made by the intestate.
Kentucky is in line with the well accepted rule that where a contract is made to devise specific property in consideration for services to
be performed, the promisee may on death of the promisor, the latter
having failed to make the promised testamentary provision, maintain
an action for breach of the contract, and recover the full value of the
promised devise, regardless of what the promisee's services were worth.
Morrison v. Land, 169 Cal. 580, 147 Pac. 259; Thompson v. Romak, 174
Ia. 155, 156 N. W. 310; Noyes v. NToyes, 224 Mass. 125, 112 N. E. 850;
Clark v. Treasurer, etc., 226 Mass. 301, 115 N. E. 416; Matter of Mallory,
13 Misc. 595, 35 N. Y. S. 155; McCurry v. Purgason,170 N. C. 463, 87 S.
E. 244. As stated in Henderson v. Davis, (Tex.) 191 S. W. 358, "The
measure of damages for the breach of a contract to devise land is governed by the same rules which control the measure in breaches of contract to convey. Ordinarily it is the value of the land to which the
contract related."
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If the contract was a valid one, or by sufficient part performance
becomes enforceable, and was to devise a specific thing or things, the
measure of recovery is the thing promised or its equivalent in money.
Thompson v. Romack, supra; Mc~urry v. Purgason,supra; Henderson
v. Davis, supra; Rood on Wills, (2nd edition), sec. 56a, page 38.
It has been held that when contracts to devise lands have been
carried into effect in the lifetime of the promisor, by his putting the
promisee into possession, he may defend against all acts of the promisor
and his assignee seeking to avoid the contract. Bird v. Pope,
73 Mich. 483, 41 N. W. 514; Carmichaelv. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 1 L.
R. A. 596, 40 N. W. 173; Tuit v. Smith, 137 Pa. St. 35, 20 Atl. 579. And
where the agreement has not been carried out and the promisor repudiates and endeavors to avoid it, the promisee is not bound to wait till the
death of the promisor, when it may be too late, but may file a bill quia
timet at once and have a decree that the land is held in trust for him.
Duvale v. Duvale, 54 N. J. Eq. 581, 40 Atl. 550, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 399-408.
Actions for breach of contract to make a will and for breach of
promise to devise in consideration of services rendered are quite numerous. Where the contract is established by clear-and convincing evidence, there seems to be no good argument against the rule under discussion. Where it is impossible to estimate the value of the consideration moving from the promisee, and the contract having been clearly
established, there can be -no injustice in allowing the estimate placed
on such services, etc., by the promisor, to govern. As stated in Usher's
Ex'r v. Flood, 17 (Ky.) S. W. 132, "He (testator) knew what services
the appellee had rendered, and hs himself fixed the compensation to
be made, and we are not disposed to allow less than the sum fixed by
one who knew more of his obligation to appellee than all the witnesses
on both sides of the controversy."
C. E. B.
WInLS-TESTATIX'S ACT IN PLACING .MUTILATED WILL IN ENELPE
MAR ED AS CONTAInING HER WILL :AND PnESEEVING SAmE UNIL DETH
HELD INCONSISTENT wITH INTENTION TO REvoxE ENTImE WI-.-The testatrix made a valid will. Afterwards she herself cut the first and second
paragraphs from the will. The remainder of the will was unmutilated
in any respect. It was then placed in an envelope by the testatrix and
carefully preserved by her up to the time og her death. Paragraph
three makes a clear distribution of the residuary estate. Held, that the
testatrix's acts did not show an intention to revoke the unmutilated
portions, of the -will. Russell, et al. v. Tyler, et al., 224 Ky. 511, 6 (2nd)
S. W. 707.
In re 'Brown's Will, 1 B. Monroe 56, in a case where A cut off all
the paragraphs of his will except the one emancipating his slaves. His
words and actions at the time showed an intention that he did not wish
to revoke the unmutilated portions. The court held that the paragraph
was still valid. The striking out by the testator of one or more devisees, but leaving the will unchanged in other respects, amounts to a
revocation pro tanto only, and does not affect the remainder of the will.
Tudor v. Tudor, 17 B. Monroe 383. The changing of the name of an exe-
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cutor will not amount to a revocation so as to require a republication.
Wells v. Wells, 4 T. B. Monroe 152. While discussing the revocation of
a will the court said: "It is the intention that must govern. The question is, has he revoked or not--yevocavit vel non?" In re Beauchamp's
Will, 20 Ky. 361.
This question does not seem to have come before the Kentucky
Court of Appeals for at least fifty years prior to this decision. The doctrine was settled at that time and since these former decisions are followed in the present case it is clear that this is the rule today.
This also appears to be the view adopted by the majority of other
Jurisdictions. An erasure of certain clauses by the testator wFith no
intention of revoking the remainder of the will is a valid revocation of
those clauses only and affects the remainder of the will in no manner.
Bigelow v. Gillott, 123 Mass. 102. See "A Treatise on the Law of Wills"
by Rood, Section 355. Also see Page on Wills, volume I, section 420.
Lines drawn through particular clauses in a will affect only that particular part, since the other portions are complete within themselves.
Home for th&e Aged v. Bantz, 107 Md. 543, 69 Atl. 376. Also see Woodstock College of Baltimore County v. Hankey, 129 Md. 675, 99 Atl. 962.
A will Is not revoked when a complete page is removed if there is no
Intention of such and the remainder is unaffected. Coghlin v. Coghlin,
85 N. E. 1058.
This decision is clearly right. It follows the doctrine already well
established in this state. It Is in accord with the view taken in the
other states. It Is also founded upon reason, since the theory is to carry
out the intention of the testator.
G. C. R.

